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ABSTRACT 
Money laundering is considered as one of the most significant types of financial crime. Its 
magnitude has only increased in the past decade alongside with the development in the 
technological field. Since the regulatory framework seeks to mitigate threats posed by existing 
financial instruments, persons willing to initiate these actions still find new ways to proceed 
with illicit activities. 
In that regard, this thesis focuses on comprehending regulatory scope and 
requirements governing virtual currency exchange service providers at the high level 
(European Union), while further analysis emphasises their implementation in Estonian and 
Latvian regulatory framework. By comprehending minimum requirements set in respective 
legal systems, in-depth analysis and further comparison will highlight differences, which 
arises between regulatory attitudes towards these service providers stemming from both 
member states of the EU. 
Since virtual currency as such has been legally defined only by the 5th anti-money 
laundering directive, the regulatory application remains uncertain, therefore theoretical and 
practical analysis, thus comparison seeks to comprehend different approaches considered by 
respective jurisdictions. 
Key words: AML, virtual currency exchange service providers, compliance, virtual 
currency, fiat currency. 
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SUMMARY 
During the past decade, money laundering has exposed and created a majority of threats to the 
global financial system. Criminals, nowadays, tend to use different types of complex schemes 
in order to integrate illicitly obtained funds into both local and international financial sector. 
By comprehending contemporary financial technology solutions, their activities have become 
even more sophisticated, thus dangerous. 
One of such financial technology is crypto or virtual currency. Since virtual currencies 
have created a huge resonant in the society, their regulatory scope has also developed 
alongside the financial technology itself. 
The author’s objected thesis “Comparative analysis of Latvian and Estonian AML 
requirements in regards to the virtual currency exchange service providers – theory and 
practice” aims to comprehend minimum requirements set in Latvian and Estonian respective 
AML laws, which, mainly, derives from 4
th
 and 5
th
 AML directive. 
The scope of this thesis respects virtual currency exchange service providers in light of 
the AML requirements set in an international and local level. As per it was mentioned, only 
virtual currency exchange service providers and their applicable legal norms will be analysed, 
thus limiting the author to the researchable amount of information. In the thesis itself, 
whenever the author mentions “virtual currency service providers” in particular form and 
wording, it should be perceived as the “virtual currency exchange service providers” instead. 
Among other things - since virtual currency topic, in general, is also related to complex 
taxation matters, this thesis will only emphasize and focus on requirements stemming from 
the AML point of view, thus avoiding any involvement of said additional provisions. 
The author of this thesis has divided the work into three separate chapters, whereas 
each chapter will supplement the next one and vice versa. 
The first chapter serves the purpose of introducing the reader with the rationale and 
cruciality of the AML by considering both international and national perspective. The whole 
chapter consists of descriptive and analytical elements, which touches upon the history of the 
virtual currencies as such and also seeks to identify key defining elements, which corresponds 
to the concept of the AML. Such correlation seeks to give a basic insight into what the AML 
essentially is and how virtual currencies have evolved during the past years. 
The second chapter elaborates and seeks to comprehend regulatory requirements set in 
Latvian and Estonian legal framework in regards to the virtual currency service providers. 
The emphasis is put on comprehending practical deficiencies stemming from regulatory 
requirements, which have been compared to the best industry practice adopted in the EU and 
elsewhere. By understanding how practically these requirements could be applied to the 
virtual currency exchange service providers, the author can establish ground fundamental for 
further comparison and additional analysis. Also, both legal and economic perspective will be 
comprehended since compliance, in general, is a very costly mechanism, which supplements 
institutions internal safeguarding systems. 
The third chapter consists of a legal and economic comparison between Latvian AML 
law minimum requirements and Estonian AML law minimum requirements. This comparison 
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is perceived by creating a fictitious scenario whereas the company X has to decide which 
market would be most suitable for desired virtual currency operations. 
In conclusion, the thesis summarizes and gives an overview of what has been 
discovered during the research phase. As per understanding the practical application 
stemming from minimum requirements set in both jurisdiction legal systems, the author gives 
an overall evaluation of whether these requirements fulfil their objectives by collecting and 
analysing the evidence throughout the whole paper. The second part of the conclusion 
analyses, which of both jurisdictions is more beneficial to operate the virtual currency 
business. By analysing both legal and economic factors, the comprehensive overview clarifies 
aforementioned.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Money laundering is a difficult crime to detect. Its consequences can have a severe 
impact on the EU's economy and on its financial system. Therefore, the EU needs to 
have a multi-faceted approach to properly tackle money laundering and terrorist 
financing. Action is needed on several levels.
1
 
As it is stipulated in the provided quote, money laundering indeed is a serious threat, which 
currently seeks to infiltrate and thus cripple the financial sector. Legislators for years have 
tried their best in order to mitigate the flow of illegally obtained funds. By introducing the 
first AML directive in 1990
2
, primordial incentives can be already detected – common 
thought of combating financial crime was quite important in order to maintain an integrity and 
trustworthiness of the EU’s financial sector. 
Having said that, it must be noted that primordial requirements, although were 
designated to prevent financial crime, in majority of cases played only a formal, rule-based 
role
3
 due to the fact that risk based approach occurred only alongside the 3
rd
/4
th
 AML 
directive
4
. Eventually, such risk based approach underlines several concepts and subsequent 
principles, which allows particular subjects of the law to ensure higher and stricter 
compliance standards.  
Nevertheless, previously mentioned risk based approach allows institutions to face and 
tolerate higher risk, therefore extension of business scope by establishing new relationships is 
more likely to occur. This, however, rises concerns, whether new relationships comes in 
addition with new technological channel risk, for instance. As per elaborating on that thought, 
one of the recent technological trend touches upon the concept of virtual currencies, their 
users and their providers. The incentives to regulate this particular sphere on the EU level can 
be already found in 2012
5
 whereas the European Central Bank issued a report indicating how 
uncertain and risk possessing such instrument can be. However, due to the rapid technological 
development, which also is reinforced by the society’s willingness to try out unexperienced 
things, virtual currencies as such gradually gained popularity
6
 among particular groups of 
people by becoming as an ordinary, supplementary thing. 
By understanding that virtual currencies indeed becomes more and more used in 
people daily lives, regulatory action was necessary in order to sustain a safe financial 
environment and mitigate unregulated threat exposure, which thrived by using particular 
instrument/asset
7
. By introducing the AML 5
th
 directive, the EU as one of the subject of the 
                                                 
1
 European Commission, Questions and Answers – Commission steps up fight against money laundering and 
terrorist financing, 07.05.2020, Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_82
1, Accessed on 13.05.2020. 
2
 European Commission, Anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing, 19 July 2018, Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-supervision-and-risk-
management/anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-financing_en, Accessed on 13.05.2020. 
3
 Paolo Costanzo, Rule – Based Vs. Risk – Based Approaches to Control. The Third EU Anti – Money 
Laundering 
Directive, Utrecht School of Economics, 03.11.2007, p. 1, Available at http://www2.econ.uu.nl/users/unger/pape
rs/Costanzo.pdf , Accessed on 13.05.2020. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Infra note 63. 
6
 Infra note 79. 
7
 Infra note 47. 
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law, made a virtual currency service providers. This, however, posed an obligation to the 
member states to integrate particular provision in respective legal systems. 
Eventually, since the member states are required to be compliant with the directive 
and given the fact that virtual currencies in general are something relatively new, different 
approach for regulating them was expected to occur, therefore, in order to comprehend 
different attitude towards these service provider, the author of this thesis selected two in 
theory similar jurisdictions and analyzed their minimum requirements stemming from the 
AML law in regards to the virtual currency exchange service providers. 
This however already establishes primordial thoughts of potential differences that may 
arise since the interpretation is left to the each member state and that would, eventually, rely 
on underlined risk perception, which has been tolerated considering national risk assessment. 
Moreover, respective requirements can be found in the Law on the Prevention of 
Money Laundering and Terrorism and Proliferation Financing (Latvia) and in the Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act (Estonia). 
Methodology 
The author of this thesis used qualitative comparative analysis in order to comprehend the 
requirements set in Latvian and Estonian AML law in regards to the virtual currency 
exchange service providers. As for the first part of the thesis, also grammatical interpretation 
method was used in order to comprehend the scope of the virtual currency service providers 
introduced by the AML 5
th
 directive. Further analysis, however was based on previously 
mentioned comparative analysis by analyzing legal acts, regulatory guidelines issued by local 
and international authorities. Additionally secondary sources such as reports, opinions and 
clarifications reinforced the arguments provided in the thesis. 
Research Questions: 
1. To what extent minimum requirements set in Latvian and Estonian AML law are 
attributable to the virtual currency exchange service providers? 
2. Which of the abovementioned jurisdictions provides more beneficial environment to 
operate a virtual currency exchange service requirement business?  
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1. KEY PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AS 
A SET OF LAWS AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
Not only the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the “EU”) but also the rest of the 
world has declared and recognized the importance of money laundering (hereinafter referred 
to as the “ML”) as an issue, which emerges and develops within the changes in regulatory 
framework. These changes, however, seeks to robust current legislative framework and 
comprehension by clarifying and thus mitigating options for criminals to avoid laws in order 
to funnel state’s financial sector with illicitly obtained funds. By passing new and more strict 
binding rules, the EU, for instance, seeks to protect its financial sector’s integrity by 
promoting good governance
8
, therefore posing an obligation to its member states (hereinafter 
referred to as the “MS”) to ensure transparency and enhanced monitoring over its financial 
institutions
9
. This chapter, on the other hand, will be devoted for describing, but mainly 
analyzing key principles and concepts of the AML in relation to internationally adopted the 
best practice principles. 
1.1. Rationale behind the concept of the AML 
As it was mentioned beforehand, the EU in particular, drives its forces towards achieving 
financial integrity and sector transparency by providing and adopting new set of procedures, 
guidelines, recommendations and decisions to the MS to be compliant with. This compliance, 
however, poses a huge burden of issues
10
, which remains delusional by reason that regulation 
is effective until the extent when it remains on paper.  
As it is observable currently, financial institutions struggles to maintain utmost 
compliance since adopted requirements are compatible and complex set of mechanisms. For 
instance, in 2018 Latvia proposed set of new requirements to mitigate AML threats due to the 
non-resident proportion having accounts in Latvian banks
11
. However non-residents turned 
out to be a huge deal since aggregate deposited amount of money accumulated up to 30% per 
year
12
. Such tranche, on the other hand, was satisfying for local bankers and incentives, thus 
provided services designed for non-residents, kept expanding by tolerating more and more 
risky customers. One of the major Latvian private bank ABLV got its license withdrawn by 
the European Central Bank
13
 (hereinafter referred to as the “ECB”) due to the commentary 
released by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (hereinafter referred to as the 
“FinCEN”), which established that 
                                                 
8
 International Monetary Fund, Assessing Financial System Integrity—Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism, Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook, Chapter 8, p. 207, Available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fsa/eng/pdf/ch08.pdf, Accessed on 05.04.2020. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Thomson Reuters, 5 questions that can help reduce the regulatory burden on compliance officers, Available at   
https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/reducing-regulatory-burden-on-compliance-officers 
Accessed on 05.04.2020. 
11
 Joshua Kirschenbaum, German Marshall Fund  of the United States, Report, 2018, Available at 
www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18827, Accessed on 05.04.2020. 
12
 Ibid, p. 2. 
13
 Pēters Putniņš, ABLV Bank AS licence ir anulēta, bankas pašlikvidācija norit FKTK uzraudzībā, FKTK, 
12.07.2018, Available at https://www.fktk.lv/jaunumi/pazinojumi-medijiem/peters-putnins-ablv-bank-as-licence-
ir-anuleta-bankas-paslikvidacija-norit-fktk-uzraudziba/, Accessed on 05.04.2020 
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[...] ABLV has institutionalized money laundering as a pillar of the bank’s 
business practices.  ABLV’s management permits the bank and its employees to 
orchestrate money laundering schemes; solicits high-risk shell company activity that 
enables the bank and its customers to launder funds; maintains inadequate controls 
over high-risk shell company accounts; and seeks to obstruct enforcement of Latvian 
anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) rules in 
order to protect these business practices
14
 
The commentary showed that AML as set of risk mitigation mechanisms, is taken 
seriously not only EU-wise, but also reflects further over the ocean. Since such notice was 
unexpected not only to the Bank itself but also to the supervisory authority Financial and 
Capital Market Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “FCMC”), escalated actions 
resulted in a self-liquidation process in which the bank is currently involved. 
1.2. Key defining elements of the AML 
As per described previously, AML has been recognized as an integrity driving concept world-
widely. However, before going into detail, it is necessary to define key elements, which are 
crucial in perceiving the concept fully. For the purposes of this section’s examination, the 
author of this work introduces three key elements, which defines the core concept of the 
AML. After having listed them, further analysis will reinforce their crucially by providing 
examples how aforementioned fits into legislative understanding. 
1.2.1. Identification 
The first defining element is an identification. Identification, hence, goes hand in hand with 
the principles set in the customer due diligence (hereinafter referred to as the “CDD”) 
requirements. 3rd AML Directive
15
, conceptually, introduced the KYC/CDD requirement in 
the Article 8, providing the following, 
Customer due diligence measures shall comprise: 
(a) identifying the customer and verifying the customer's identity 
on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and 
independent source; 
(b) identifying, where applicable, the beneficial owner and taking 
risk-based and adequate measures to verify his identity so that the 
institution or person covered by this Directive is satisfied that it knows 
who the beneficial owner is, including, as regards legal persons, trusts and 
similar legal arrangements, taking risk-based and adequate measures to 
understand the ownership and control structure of the customer; [...]
16
 
By comprehending the quoted text, it is possible to drive a conclusion that CDD 
measures are highly necessary for establishing an overall understanding of who the customer 
is. After having conducted the identification process, the subject of the law creates a 
                                                 
14
 Steve Hudak, FinCEN Names ABLV Bank of Latvia an Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern 
and Proposes Section 311 Special Measure, 13.02.2018, Available at 
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-names-ablv-bank-latvia-institution-primary-money-
laundering-concern-and, Accessed on 05.04.2020 
15
 Directive  2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and  of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention 
of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing. 
16
 Ibid, Article 8. 
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primordial comprehension of the possible arising risks and the nature of the expected 
relationship. Financial Action Task Force’s (hereinafter referred to as the “FATF”) 
recommendation Nr. 10
17
 specifically addresses this issue by forbidding to maintain business 
relations with the anonymous account holders
18
. Due to this principal's significant 
implication, the author of this work purses identification as on the defining element of the 
whole AML concept. 
1.2.2. Transparency 
As for the second key element, the author of this work highly emphasizes Commission’s 
incentives to establish an EU-wide transparency
19
 framework within its internal market, 
therefore transparency as a key element will be analyzed further in this subsection. 
Transparency has two natures - global and internal, whereas both causes each other. 
Transparency, although should be perceived as a different topic, goes hand in hand 
with the aforementioned in a line that identification as such ensures further traceability of 
customer’s funds, which eventually means a transparent operations in the bank account. This, 
however, should be perceived as an internal transparency due to the fact that it occurs 
between a subject of the law and the customer. European Banking Authority (hereinafter 
referred to as the “EBA”) emphasizes that “Firms should ensure that their approach to 
transaction monitoring is effective and appropriate”20. By recycling the aforementioned, the 
credit institutions are required by the law to implement effective set of procedures and 
processes governing transaction monitoring for the purposes of ensuring transparency and 
compliance with the law within the financial institution. 
As it was mentioned in the beginning, the transparency as such can be divided in two 
separate categories - global and internal. By clarifying, what in the author’s opinion should be 
understood as an internal transparency, the global one goes hand in hand with it.  
Whilst internal transparency occurs within the institution, the global one is highly 
affected by the compliance results of the first one. For instance, let us suppose, that the state 
A is the MS of the EU. All the regulatory requirements are binding and for the purposes of 
this example - transposed into the national legislation. State’s A supervisory authority has 
been instructed by the EU to closely monitor its financial sector and participating credit 
institutions. If, for instance, participating credit institutions are not being compliant with the 
law, assessment of their performance in the field of ML will be evaluated as low, thus 
receiving a negative result in compliance assessment.  
                                                 
17
 International Standards On Combating Money Laundering and The Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation 
The FATF Recommendations updated June 2019, Recommendation No. 10 
18
 Ibid, p. 12. 
19
 Sophie van Bijsterveld, Section 5, Transparency In The European Union: A Crucial Link In Shaping The New 
Social Contract Between The Citizen And The Eu, Available at https://www.ip-
rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdf/clanki/Agenda__Bijsterveld-Paper.pdf Accessed on 05.04.2020. 
20
 Draft Guidelines under Articles 17 and 18(4) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 on customer due diligence and the 
factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the money laundering and terrorist 
financing risk associated with individual business relationships and occasional transactions (‘’The Risk Factors 
Guidelines’’), amending Guidelines JC/2017/37 TRANSACTION MONITOIRNG Accessed on 05.04.2020. 
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Mentioned transparency, on the other hand, underlines risks, which emerges, if 
appropriate set of mitigating controls have not been tolerated adequately
21
. Risks, such as 
reputational and financial can occur unexpectedly, therefore, in order to maintain sound 
management over the institution, it necessary to implement straightforward and concise 
guidelines
22
, which governs overall approach in governing daily operations of the said 
institution.  
1.2.3. Risk based approach 
Having said aforementioned, the third defining AML element is risk-based approach
23
 
(hereinafter referred to as the “RBA”). By comprehending this term, it is crucial to firstly 
define what the risk is, thus according to the report issued by the World Bank, the term risk 
defines “the combination of the likelihood of an adverse event (hazard, harm) occurring, and 
of the potential magnitude of the damage caused (itself combining number of people affected, 
and severity of the damage for each)”24. As per the definition provided by the World Bank, it 
is duly perceivable that risk contains set of adverse events and potential consequences. 
European Commission, on the other hand, reinforces the term risk, by dividing two separate 
variables - hazard
25
 and risk
26
 and therefore stipulates the following  
A hazard is any source of potential damage, harm or adverse effects on something 
(e.g. the environment) or someone. Risk is the chance or probability that a person or 
something will be harmed or experience an adverse effect if exposed to a hazard.
27
 
Hereby, in relation to the ML, Article 1, subparagraph 1.1 of the FCMC’s provision 
Nr.3 (which is not in force anymore), defines risk as “[...] the impact and probability that a 
credit institution may be used in money laundering or terrorism financing”28. 
As it is observable, all provided explanations seeks to follow a single common 
denominator - there has to be an occurrence of an event, which demonstrates within itself an 
element of threat or incident, which, eventually, reinforces threats towards a particular 
                                                 
21
 EY, Why financial institutions need to focus on transparency, 12.07.2019, Available at 
https://www.ey.com/en_om/tax/why-financial-institutions-need-to-focus-on-transparency Accessed on 
05.04.2020. 
22
 Mckinsey&Company, Why anti-money laundering should be top priority for financial 
institutions, Available at https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/financial%20services/banking
%20blog/why%20aml%20should%20be%20a%20top%20priority%20for%20financial%20institutions/why-aml-
should-be-a-top-priority-for-financial-institutions.ashx, Accessed on 05.04.2020. 
23
 Zhang Fan, The “Risk-Based” Principle of AML Management, 19.09.2017, Available at 
https://www.acamstoday.org/the-risk-based-principle-of-aml-management/, Accessed on 05.04.2020. 
24
 Florentin Blanc, Ernesto Franco-Temple, Introducing a risk-based approach to regulate businesses, how to 
build a risk matrix to classify enterprises or activities, Nuts & bolts. Washington, DC, World Bank Group, 2013, 
Available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/102431468152704305/Introducing-a-risk-based-
approach-to-regulate-businesses-how-to-build-a-risk-matrix-to-classify-enterprises-or-activities, Accessed on 
05.04.2020. 
25
 European Commission, What Is Hazard And Risk, Risk Assessment And Management, Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/better-regulation-toolbox-15_en_0.pdf, Accessed on 
06.04.2020. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid, What Is Hazard and Risk. 
28
 Section 1.1., Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisijas 2018. gada 9. janvāra noteikumi Nr. 3 "Klientu padziļinātās 
izpētes normatīvie noteikumi kredītiestādēm un licencētām maksājumu un elektroniskās naudas iestādēm". 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 10, 15.01.2018, Available at https://likumi.lv/ta/id/296439/redakcijas-datums/2018/06/02. 
Accessed on 06.04.2020. 
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subject. In relation to the subject matter, endangered subjects can be both - involved persons 
in the ML activities itself, and negatively affected financial institutions, which, as a matter of 
an opinion, can also be considered as involved persons, if the harm has been done 
intentionally. 
After having defined the first essential element of the RBA, proceeding clarifications 
seeks to establish an environment for parallels between the AML and RBA, where concept is 
developed by introducing mutual correlation as a tool, which is used to combat ML. 
Financial Action Task Force (hereinafter referred to as the “FATF”) has passed 
multiple guidelines and recommendations for both MS and financial institutions in order to 
more efficiently mitigate and identify ML posed risks
29
 and to the extent possible - avoid 
potential involvement of being engaged in the ML and sanctions violation schemes
30
 directly 
or indirectly. Considering RBA as one of defining elements for the concept of AML, the 
FATF, moreover, throughout its report “Guidance of a risk-based approach. The Banking 
Sector., October 2014”31 emphasizes the need to tolerate risk, using RBA for the purposes of 
establishing a risk assessment system, which must assign the corresponding level of risk for 
each of the financial institution’s customer32. This provision, on the other hand, also consists 
of the necessity to perceive possible both residual and inherited risks, which might affect the 
institution's credibility, reputation and operability in the market
33
. In practice, the 
aforementioned numerical risk assessment is transposed into the scoring system, which 
determines two aspects - level of the risk and precise score thriving from the assigned level. 
For the purposes of establishing a fundamental clarity, the author by using the best 
international industry practice will elaborate on the practical rationale behind the scoring 
system.  
There are 6 possible levels of risk - very low, low, medium, high, very high
34
 and the 
level exceeding “very high” is considered as a zero-tolerance policy threshold, where 
customers accumulating such score are automatically prohibited to open an account to further 
operate in the financial system with their funds by reason of exposing risks, which are 
contrary to the institution’s risk appetite.  
Nevertheless, after establishing what the levels of risk are, each of them consists of 
certain numerical margins whereas each category is assignable after considering different 
circumstances and scenarios adopted by the financial institution. Let’s imagine, that the 
institution has set the following margins as: 
● 1-10 corresponds to the very low risk 
● 11-25 corresponds to the low risk 
● 26-51 corresponds to the medium risk 
● 51-78 corresponds to the high risk 
                                                 
29
  FATF, Who we are, Available at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ , Accessed on 06.04.2020. 
30
 Ibid 
31
 FATF, Guidance for A Risk-Based Approach, The Banking Sector, 2014, Available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Risk-Based-Approach-Banking-Sector.pdf, 
Accessed on 07.04.2020. 
32
 Ibid, Assessing ML/TF Risk, p. 9. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid, Germany, p. 28. 
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● 79-100 corresponds to the very high risk 
● >100 corresponds to the prohibition to open a bank account for the 
customer.  
The particular scoring for a customer is generated by comprehending different 
scenarios provided by both national supervisory authority (FCMC in Latvia, the Bank of 
Lithuania in Lithuania, etc.), and international safeguard/watchdog (the FATF, the EBA, etc.). 
These scenarios are created in a way, that financial institutions are free to determine 
applicable risk score for particular factor, for instance, in the latest commentary
35
 passed by 
the EBA, several question-related factors
36
 have been introduced, which seeks to clarify the 
business nature of the customer, thus reinforcing the KYC principles. Furthermore - as it was 
clarified previously, the risk score is generated by summing accumulated risk factors, for 
instance, the risk factor stipulates that increased customer risk occurs if the customer or 
related person is a politically exposed person (hereinafter referred to as the “PEP”)37. In such 
case, financial institution is responsible for assigning a risk score considering inherited risk 
exposure
38
. If, for instance, the institution seeks to score such factor by 10 points, it means, 
that whenever a customer will have an applicable PEP factor, it automatically will receive 10 
points to his/her aggregate risks assessment. And by scoring each of implemented ML risk 
factor, the institution will have a comprehensive risk scoring system assigning particular 
scores for particular customers whereas, eventually, the RBA has been used as a tool to 
mitigate potential involvement in the ML schemes and, thus reinforcing and transposing AML 
core values and driving incentives in a material format. 
Regardless of the previously mentioned example, the RBA is also used in order to 
determine financial institution’s risk appetite (by also applying enterprise wide risk 
assessment
39
 (hereinafter referred to as the “EWRA”)), tone from the top, risk mitigation 
strategy. 
1.3. Historical background of virtual currencies 
Due to the nature of this paper and prior conducting an extensive legal analysis, the author of 
this paper seeks to establish the fundamental background to understand how the virtual 
                                                 
35
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currencies are treated in the EU framework, how they must be perceived and what are the key 
aspects, which makes them as an opaque financial instrument in regards to comprehension 
from the AML perspective. 
Since the rapid development in popularity of this financial instrument, it has exposed 
new and complex threats and risks
40
 of how it can be used for illegitimate reasons. If, for 
instance, 5 years ago majority of people were not aware that such financial instrument as 
virtual currencies exists
41
, nowadays the portion of people who have heard something about 
virtual currencies is far greater than it was previously. As per their failure to become  as a 
sovereign payment method
42
, virtual currencies, stimulated by their decentralization, have 
turned to be appealing and attractive for terrorists
43
 in order to maintain their activities 
possible. To establish greater clarity - large or relatively large terrorist organizations are not 
relying on financing their operations by using virtual currencies due to the unpredictable 
volatility
44
 and instability
45
, although these type of financial instruments are mostly used by 
so called lone wolfs
4647
 in considerably younger age since their comprehension and skills in 
technological sphere are far more advanced than older generation has. 
1.3.1. Driving incentives for regulating virtual currencies 
In order to even perceive key factors, which were at the time remarkable and sufficient 
enough to establish primordial incentives to regulate this particular niche, the author of this 
work is willing to set aligned definition of what virtual currencies are and what are driving 
differences, which separates it from other type of financial instrument. 
Prior the 5th AML directive being issued, there was no legal and unified term of what 
virtual currencies or crypto currencies are. Each watchdog had introduced its own definition 
of what these financial instruments might be considered as
48
, by basing their opinions on 
surrounding specific circumstances and scope of work. The FATF has its own definition, 
which was similar but with minor differences to one, which was established by the EBA, for 
instance, therefore such distinction created a regulatory loophole and gap where conceptual 
comprehension existed, while practical approach and practice was not yet established. 
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Nevertheless, as per defined by the European Commission in the AML 5th Directive
49
, 
amendments made in the Article 3, by introducing the term “virtual currencies” stipulates that,  
“virtual currencies” means a digital representation of value that is not issued or 
guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority, is not necessarily attached to a 
legally established currency and does not possess a legal status of currency or money, 
but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of exchange and which can be 
transferred, stored and traded electronically
50
 
The introduction of such term has been explained in the preamble of the said directive, 
specifically in recital Nr. 9, which demonstrates that “[t]he anonymity of virtual currencies 
allows their potential misuse for criminal purposes”51. Thus as it is perceivable, the first 
emerging issue touches upon the failure to avoid anonymity whilst these financial instruments 
are used.  
As for the second determining issue, the author of this work points out the distinction 
made by the FATF in 2014 between centralized and decentralized virtual currencies.
52
 As it is 
stipulated in the report, centralized virtual currencies have issuing and administrative 
authority, which maintains, regulates and passes rules and guidelines of what can and what 
cannot be done with this type of currency
53
, whilst decentralized virtual currencies, such as 
bitcoin, does not have specific characteristics of a currency, nor it has a backed value
54
, nor it 
has an administrative authority
55
. As being pointed out as a second concern, emphasized 
methodological problem creates a breakthrough for the ML to occur due to the lack of the 
EU-wide regulatory framework, which was not developed at the time back then. 
By having identified two main concerns, which underlines possible threats in relation 
to the ML, the author of this work seeks to establish last element, which poses challenges in 
relation to legal framework - technological complexity
56
. For the purposes of clarifying 
technological rationale behind virtual currencies, derivative - cryptocurrency as well as 
supplementing blockchain will be taken as reference point to establish a case. 
According to the European Commission, blockchain is 
[...] a technology that allows people and organizations to reach agreement on and 
permanently record transactions and information in a transparent way without a 
central authority. It has been recognized as an important tool for building a fair, 
inclusive, secure and democratic digital economy [...].
57
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However this definition is not comprehensible enough due to its “positive nature”. 
Key concerns, which arises from the blockchain, touches upon the 
anonymity/pseidoanonimity58 and lack of determinable liability involved in the transaction 
between the parties
59
. Nevertheless, due to the fact that blockchain is a form of distributed 
ledger technology
60
, there have been incentives to put a regulatory framework over this 
technological concept. 
Aforementioned regulatory framework could be imposed on the blockchain, if its legal 
status would be recognized. This, however, seeks to have an identification for related 
functions, which should be taken into account prior recognizing ones status. “[...] logging and 
time stamping of transactions, linked recording and digital signing, cryptography, access and 
permission, digital identity, consensus algorithms”61 - these functions are cumulatively 
integrated in the blockchain
62
 and defines its complex nature. Although they are not new and 
can be found already as working tools, some of these functions can be regulated by the 
Regulation Nr. L 257/73 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic 
transactions in the internal market
63
.  
The key concern, which forbids recognizing blockhain’s legal status is that there is a 
relative and practical unavailability to impose liability claims on involved parties
64
 as well as 
blockchain could not be recognized as Trust Service Provider (hereinafter referred to as the 
“TSP”) since it lacks full scope of signatory integrity.  
As per having identified three main concerns, which emerges from the virtual 
currencies, the author of this work has clarified what are the main circumstances pushing 
regulatory framework towards complete compliance, however, on the other hand, the author 
can already draw a conclusion, that these financial instruments, regardless of their novelty, 
constitutes set of complex principles and mechanisms, which are merely impossible to 
comprehend and efficiently regulate on a practical basis. Underlined risk exposures are not 
genuinely manageable, therefore adopted incentives to regulate this particular technological 
solution may work in the theory, since the financial sector have just understood legal 
requirements set in the AML 5th directive. Such rapid development in the legislative 
framework means high level adoption and alignment, thus in-depth notion may not even 
appear as it was expected. 
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1.3.2. Development of the regulatory framework in the EU and Latvian context 
As it was discussed previously, defined regulatory requirements governing virtual currencies 
appeared only when the 5th AML directive was passed and, thus came in force.  Beforehand 
there was a lack of equivalent regulation since a hectic and even holistic approach was 
implied.  
1.3.2.1. The EU-wide context 
In order to comprehend the existing development of regulatory framework regarding virtual 
currencies on a national (Latvian) scale, it is necessary to analyses and discerns EU-wide 
aligned approach for determining what are the components and familiar elements of 
cryptocurrencies or virtual currencies.  
Among the other things, one of the first EU-wide sub-legal discussions surrounding 
virtual currencies can be found already in 2012, when the European Central Bank (hereinafter 
referred to as the “ECB”) issued a report on virtual currencies schemes (October 2012)65 
stipulation opinions of what virtual currencies are, what are their potential implications to the 
financial sector and what are the potential issues emerging from the usage of said
66
. The 
author of this work does not recognize nor establishes the fact that this particular report serves 
the basis for regulating cryptocurrencies or virtual currencies, in contrary - it ought to be 
perceived as one of the first issued reports by the supervisory authority for the purposes of 
clarifying certain specific questions/concerns. 
Already in 2012 it has been acknowledged that virtual currencies as means of payment 
exists and can have a futuristic impact on the sector and understanding of what money is and 
what might be the next big tendencies in its regard. Eventually, the issued report created a 
fertile soil for building opinion-based non-binding resolutions, which clarified recent 
tendencies and key issues concerning the usage of virtual currencies. 
Prior to this report, however, certain MS recognized virtual currencies as a means of 
payment. For instance, although one year later in 2013, Germany, under German Banking 
Act, by classifying virtual currencies as financial instruments
67
, recognized such possibility to 
conduct a transaction, whereas virtual currencies are involved. German supervisory authority 
recognized that by using this decentralized payment method, involved parties essentially 
shares the same characteristics as it would be in the case of having an exchange of goods by 
involving money as perceived in the common context
68
. Earlier, already in 2011, France had 
held discussions arguing, addressing and rising concerns about digital currencies possible 
involvement in the ML and terrorist financing schemes
69
. Digital currencies or from a 
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contemporary point of view - virtual currencies - France defined as the type of money, which 
is not transparent
70
 and mostly is used for illicit purposes
71
. 
As it is observable, at the very early stage of the rise of virtual currencies, different 
MS had different opinions, thus divided point of view can be established. Possibly, such a 
holistic approach can be addressed as one of the arguments why the EU failed to establish a 
strict and unified regulation for virtual currencies and their related service providers. If, for 
instance, one country within the EU recognizes and seeks to develop virtual currency 
utilization in the financial sector, while the other one has created a negative perception about 
its involvement in financial trade, the collusion arises, thus creating a complex and unsolvable 
set of issues, which are already hazardous in its core theory.  
Nevertheless, the EU kept addressing more and more opinions regarding virtual 
currencies and the technological aspect behind it. In 2013, the EBA issued a warning 
addressed to the consumers, who are directly or indirectly involved in the transactions using 
virtual currencies
72
. Warning, amongst other things, raised additional concerns regarding the 
unregulated environment for such transactions as well as possible criminal nature in regards to 
ML and tax evasions
73
. This might be considered as one of the first public statements made by 
the supervisory authority addressing the ML concerns due to the gradual increase in 
popularity among persons who are operating with these financial instruments. 
Years 2014 and respectively, 2015 were significant due to the incentives provided by 
both - EBA and ECB. EBA, in 2014, issued its opinion on virtual currencies
74
, by examining 
key risks endangering the EU-wide financial sector as well as addressing answers to the 
questions related to the regulatory framework. In relation to the ML, EBA addressed two 
main arguments. The first one - “Criminals are able to launder proceeds of crime because they 
can deposit and transfer VCs anonymously.”75 And the second one - “Criminals are able to 
launder proceeds of crime because they can deposit and transfer VCs globally, rapidly and 
irrevocably.”76. As per these concerns, it can be concluded that, after monitoring the situation 
after statement announced in 2013, the EBA has recognized concerns, which were established 
by France in already 2011. The author abstains from drawing parallels between report issued 
by France and information stipulated in the report
77
, however clear indication of causality can 
be observed. 
The ECB issued another report in 2015
78
, which was considered as the enhancement 
of the previous one. Said document was introduced in 2012 in regards to the virtual currency 
schemes. It seeks to provide more detailed analysis of emerging trends and typologies of 
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virtual currencies. On the contrary side of the previously issued report, this, as well as the 
EBA’s, seeks to emphasize the side, which consists of entitled risks79 due to the fact that 
decentralized virtual currencies such as Bitcoin has become more and more popular and the 
mining of it have only increased since its establishment
80
. 
Eventually, after the key EU level watchdogs have shared their opinions and 
guidelines in regards to the virtual currencies, the author of this work would not like to go into 
more detail due to the fact that, for the purposes of this section, it was necessary to 
comprehend primordial incentives rather than currently existing ones. Afterwards, this paper 
will examine regulatory requirements governing virtual currency service providers in Latvia 
and elsewhere in the EU.  
As for the concluding remarks, it is observable that the EU authorities started to 
identify issues and cornerstones right after this method of payment achieved its primordial 
popularity boost. After it has been operating in the market for some time, authorities began 
monitoring activities on a global and local level, by supervising each MS’s capabilities to deal 
with arising form of financial instrument. As from the economics perspective - since it was 
never recognized as conceivable money, it failed to fulfil major roles
81
, which characterized 
it: 
1) Limited ability to store a reliable value due to the high price 
volatility
82
; 
2) Acceptance network restricts its usage as a medium of exchange83; 
3) Represents the value against the exchange rate not against the value of 
involved good/service.
84
  
1.3.2.2. The national context 
As it was mentioned elsewhere in the thesis, the year 2014 and 2015 turned out to be a 
remarkable reference point for virtual currencies to start their rise in the global market. In 
parallel to the ongoing situation in the EU, Latvian national airline carrier “AirBaltic” 
announced that Bitcoin will be accepted as an alternative payment method
85
, thus becoming 
the first such service provider in the EU offering particular alternatives
86
. On the contrary, 
Latvijas Banka (in English - the Central Bank of Latvia) collectively with the FCMC issued a 
joint warning whereas it was stated that Bitcoin should not be perceived as a payment method 
due to the lack of regulation and characteristics, which defines money as people tend to 
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comprehend it
87
. This previously specified lack of regulation have risen deep concerns 
whether such payment method should be tolerated at all. On the hand, cross border juggernaut 
watchdogs have stated and publicly announced that virtual currencies underline several risks, 
which must be tolerated as a potential threat for the EU-wide financial sector, while on the 
other hand, MS are keen to implement this alternative financial instrument in their integrated 
financial sectors. 
This, however, drives a conclusion, that MS are keen to extend their monetary 
taxonomy by introducing new and attractive ways of conducting transactions/deals
88
. By 
extending specified sphere, peer-to-peer and decentralized nature seeks to attract more and 
more customers from abroad, thus guaranteeing greater national-level cash flow, whereas 
potential risks are treated to be almost non-existent and irrelevant. 
Latvian State Revenue Service (hereinafter referred to as the “SRS”) in 2017 issued a 
comment clarifying taxation aspects which surrounds virtual currency aspect
89
. It has been 
stated that virtual currencies should be considered as commodities and therefore, according to 
the Law on Personal Income Tax, taxation matters should be calculated in the amount of 
23%
9091
, whilst in 2015 judgment of the Court in case C-264/14 ruled that Bitcoin in 
particular can be considered having the nature of the currency
92
 (thus can be recognized as a 
means of payment), therefore transactions concluded by using this cryptocurrency should not 
be regarded as the subject for VAT taxation
93
. 
Eventually, contemporary comprehension from the perspective of Law of Personal 
Income Tax states that virtual currencies are recognized as capital assets
94
, whilst the Law on 
the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism and Proliferation Financing subjects 
virtual currency service providers
95
 to be compliant with this law in order to offer services to 
the general public. As per the regulation
96
, virtual currency service providers are supervised 
by the SRS. 
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2. VIRTUAL CURRENCIES IN THE EU AND LATVIAN AML REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
The previous chapter provided a comprehensive idea of what essentially AML is, what are the 
key components of it and what regulatory steps have been taken in order to regulate 
operability of virtual currencies on the EU level. As per analysis conducted beforehand, the 
author emphasizes incentives taken by the supervisory watchdogs, which, essentially, could 
be classified as clarification seeking and opinion providing activities for the purposes of 
acknowledging existence of said financial instruments/currencies in the EU’s financial sector. 
This, as a result, corresponded to introducing virtual currencies
97
 as defined term in the AML 
5th directive, which, eventually, by consisting of legally binding nature, created an obligation 
to MSs to transpose its amended requirements into national legislation. These amendments, 
nevertheless, established that virtual currency service providers must be recognized as the 
subjects of the respective AML law
98
. 
2.1. Analysis and interpretation of the AML 5th directive - provisions 
governing virtual currencies and virtual currency service providers 
on the EU level 
The major amendments regarding the virtual currencies, as stated previously, touches upon 
the requirements to ensure that virtual currency service providers should now be considered as 
the subjects to the 5th AML directive. Eventually, the directive does not specifically define 
virtual currency service providers as such. In other words, it has been stated as “providers 
engaged in exchange services between virtual currencies and fiat currencies”99. 
Extended scope introduces the term “fiat currencies”. As per the clarification provided 
by the ECB, the fiat currency is “value designated as legal tender, typically in the form of 
notes or coins”100 (e.g. EUR, USD, GPB). 
By analysing the whole term collectively, a key “finding” can be already observed. 
From the first glance, it is not clear, whether subjects to the AML law should be persons, who 
are offering services to the third party (for instance - legal entity offers its services to the 
customer in exchange receiving fiat currency), or whether subjects to the AML law should 
also be persons, which are conducting an entity-to-entity transaction (for instance - legal 
entity conducts a transaction with other legal entity, whereas both have agreed to trade Bitcoin 
to the US dollar, without involving a conversion element
101
, for instance)
102
. 
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As per understanding the directive itself, the proposed scope is attributable to the 
situations whereas services related to the virtual currencies are offered in a format of 
business-to-customer relationship, not, as it was assumed for the explanatory purposes, in the 
format of a business-to-business relationship. In addition, the FATF has taken an incentive 
and defined that virtual currency service providers must be recognized as persons, which “[...] 
conducts activities which fall within the FATF definition of a financial institution
103
 [...]. This 
includes convertible virtual currency exchangers where convertible VC activities intersect 
with the regulated fiat currency financial system”104. Therefore, by considering FATF’s 
involvement in clarifying issues related to the virtual currencies, adopted definition underlines 
the scope, whereas the virtual currency service providers are engaging in business-to-
customer type of relationship. 
Furthermore, after the directive’s scope has been clarified, it is necessary to 
comprehend minimum requirements set by the said document since the regulator has imposed 
an obligation to MS to implement the said provision. 
Minimum requirements, in general, must be observed in respective jurisdiction 
legislation, since some nuances of the directive itself can be interpreted differently, by 
considering attributable unique risk factors, which particular geographic region faces. This, in 
particular, will be analyzed further in the thesis, whereas Latvian regulatory requirements will 
be considered to assess compliance norms for virtual currency service providers.  
Prior to providing an explanation to the following, a synergy between the AML 4th 
and the AML 5th directive must be understood, therefore an overall comprehension will be 
established.  
As it is observable, the AML 5th directive is an amending part to the previous AML 
4th directive, which was passed as an enhanced version of the 3rd AML directive. Eventually, 
the 4th AML directive emphasized several risk based approach
105
 requirements, which were 
designated for the MSs to implement them in their national legal systems. This risk based 
approach means low-level assessment and comprehension of residual and inherent risks that 
particular country is facing. Moreover, reinforced KYC/CDD requirements for the subjects of 
the law were introduced in order to extend the existing scope of examining relationship 
between the subject of the law and the customer. 
Furthermore, since the AML 4th directive still is in force, its requirements are still 
directly applicable to the MS, therefore amendments made by the 5th directive supplements 
the 4th directive and extends the scope of it. Eventually this means that existing general 
directive (AML 4th directive) has currently been reinforced, therefore, its requirements are 
now also directly applicable to the subjects of the law, which were introduced by the 5th 
directive (in this case - virtual currency service providers). 
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Nevertheless, since virtual currency exchange service providers have been classified 
as the subjects of the law, AML 4th directive requirements are therefore directly applicable, 
however, the issue already arises - the AML 4th directive came in force in 2015, whilst the 
AML 5th directive came in force in 2018, meaning that requirements established in 2015 were 
designed for subjects of the law, which were identified for the purposes of the 4th AML 
directive. 
This particular nuance, eventually, means, that theoretically, due to the reason, that 
virtual currencies as such were recognized as defined term only in 2018, and understanding 
the fact, that the technology behind virtual currencies is rather complicated and not yet 
regulated by the legislative authority, threats arising from this subject cannot be theoretically 
comprehended by the 4th AML directive scope. Indeed, it is possible to identify similarities, 
typologies with other types of financial services and currency exchange service providers, 
however, ex ante methodology cannot be adopted on general regulatory-matters basis.  
By establishing a fictitious scenario, let’s suppose that all the regulatory requirements 
are directly applicable to the virtual currency service providers. As an example, let’s consider 
suspicious transaction reporting (hereinafter referred to as the “SRS”, in the 4th AML 
directive referred to as the unusual or suspicious transactions/activity
106
) as a requirement, 
which must be addressed whenever a subject of the law identifies that there are 
suspicious/unusual nature of the transaction or activity
107
. Having said that, suspicious 
activity can be identified by assessing different characteristics against executed 
transactions/observed nature either provided by the national law, international guidelines or 
internal governance. For the sake of the argument, let’s suppose that the virtual currencies 
service provider has implemented all the risk identification related characteristics into its 
internal policies and procedures. Among the other things, the first issue arises - to what extent 
and how greatly the subject is required to investigate nature of the transaction, for instance? 
For example, currency exchange has been conducted from EUR to the Bitcoin (an 
abbreviation of “BTC” will be used further in the text, if it is connected to the Bitcoin as 
means of payment). Basically, the company X, which provides currency exchange services is 
required to buy BTC, whilst in exchange giving EUR to the third party. As per understanding 
that blockchain offers pseudonymity
108
, the deal itself will be rather transparent than opaque, 
however if other currency would be involved with more stricter anonymity requirements, the 
situation would be that nor nature nor transaction’s reasoning could be classified as suspicious 
only by the fact that there are no particular characteristics set by the law/guidelines. This, 
eventually, could lead to opposite false-positive cases, where due to the lack of regulation, all 
the transactions and behaviors could not be noticed since regulatory framework was not 
originally designated to regulate such types of transactions/behavior. Of course, such 
requirements as identification or verification of the customer can be satisfied, but regardless 
of that, the AML does not stops after understanding who or what is particular institution’s 
customer.  
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As it was mentioned beforehand, the scope of the AML 5th directive covers only those 
virtual currency service providers, who are offering currency exchange as a service, i.e. 
person holds certain amount of BTCs and is willing to trade them against the fiat currency of 
EUR, for instance. 
As per having this in mind, primordially it is not clear what risks except ensuring the 
counterparty with the fiat currency can else arise due to this line of service. Indeed, this type 
of exchange underlines certain sanctions risk exposure as well possible ML risk exposure due 
to the opaqueness, however, it is not clear how far does the virtual currency service provider 
is required to regulate itself.  
Let’s suppose, that by having implemented all the regulatory requirements in 
institutions procedures, the institution, accordingly has obtained the said BTC. For the 
purposes of this example, the author seeks to assume that all the minimum requirements set 
by the law are treated respectively and accordingly. Moreover, after the BTC has been 
obtained, the question further arises - since the fiat currency has been exchanged to the virtual 
currency, most likely the said institution will make financial speculations with it i.e. trade it in 
the exchange platform. Taking this into account - is the institution required to somehow 
monitor their activities in respect to the AML provisions? As far as it has been defined, stock 
exchange must validate and identify whether their customer funds (institution in our example) 
are legitimate and with understandable nature, but there's nothing stated in the directive that 
the said virtual currency service providers must monitor and supervise their own further 
activities. 
Hence, since the scope was extended by introducing the term of virtual currency 
service providers, also supervisory activities have been reinforced by setting as a requirement 
for MS to ensure that “providers of exchange services between virtual currencies and fiat 
currencies, and custodian wallet providers, are registered [...]”109. Understanding hereby 
written, the provision emphasizes the word “registered” not “licensed”, for instance, therefore, 
by applying common approach, the requirement does not create an obligation for MS to have 
additional requirements for issuing a license whereas it would be in the case with the credit 
institution, for instance. Moreover, the respective AML authority in the jurisdiction is 
required only to maintain a register where particular subjects are listed for a general consumer 
availability, thus avoiding any specific intervention in its credibility or business practice
110
, 
which would be in a case with the requirement to issue specifically tailored licenses.  
2.2. AML minimum regulatory requirements in Latvian legal system in 
regards to the virtual currency service providers 
Beforehand, the author of this thesis emphasized key elements, which describes AML as a 
risk-based tool used in order to mitigate and combat ML possessed threats as well as clarified 
and analyzed the scope of the AML 5th directive in relation to the virtual currency service 
providers. The EU-wide context provided a primordial understanding and comprehension of 
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how the virtual currencies and their service providers are perceived, therefore giving an 
indication of what might be expected in the national regulatory framework. 
The governing and general AML law in Latvia is the Law on the Prevention of Money 
Laundering and Terrorism and Proliferation Financing (hereinafter referred to as the “Latvian 
AML law”). It provides general requirements and scope of what are the primordial 
compliance norms for each of the subject of the law. According to the purpose of the law “[...] 
to prevent money laundering and terrorism and proliferation financing.”111, it can be 
established that the specific legal act, regardless of other supplementary provisions, serves the 
sole purpose of regulating the market in a generic manner.  
2.2.1. Supervisory authority 
Prior perceiving minimum requirements established in the law, which regulates virtual 
currency service providers from the AML perspective, it is necessary to examine the 
competent authority, which is responsible for supervising the business activity of the said 
subject. 
Article 45, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 6e
112
 of the Latvian AML law stipulates that 
the sole supervisory authority of the virtual currency exchange service providers is the State 
Revenue Service (hereinafter referred to as the “SRS”). Unlike in case with the credit 
institutions and the FCMC as the supervisory authority, for instance, the SRS is directly 
responsible for regulating the market and its participant's activities in regards to the AML 
provisions. As it was stipulated in the 5th AML directive, the competent authority is also 
responsible for maintaining the subject of the law register, hence corresponding regulatory 
requirement can be found in the Article 46 of the Latvian AML law
113
. 
At first glance, the rationale behind appointing the SRS as the competent supervisory 
authority remains unclear since foreign currency exchange service providers are directly 
supervised by the Latvijas Banka
114
. The nature behind exchanging fiat currency to other 
foreign fiat currency is equivalent to nature whereas virtual currency is exchanged to other 
virtual currency, for instance. This, however, raises concerns due to the fact that currency 
exchange service sector in general in the EU MSs has been exposed to the ML threats. The 
concern was already raised on the EU level in 2010, where the FATF identified key issues 
concerning customer risk and lack of legislative powers to regulate this sphere of financial 
services. In general - whenever the currency exchange used to occur, small payment tranches 
were involved, thus hindering the possibility to establish comprehension of the source of 
funds
115
. 
Nevertheless, the same difficulty was established by Latvijas Banka in the annual risk 
assessment report. It was stated, that due to the fact that these transactions have immediate 
exchange nature, respective service providers lack resources and general capacity to be 
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completely compliant with the requirements set by the regulator, thus failing to ensure fully 
comprehensive due diligence measures i.e. understanding the source of funds or assessing the 
trustworthiness of the received information from the customer
116
. These deficiencies, 
nevertheless, thrives from rapid cash involvement, which, eventually, may lead to opaqueness 
and anonymity issues. 
As it was discussed previously, in Latvia there is more than one supervisory authority. 
Other such as the Consumer Rights Protection Centre, SRS, FCMC, they all have their own 
scope of supervisory obligations, thus emphasizing the variety of provided financial services 
in the territory. Having said that, the obvious conclusion can be derived that due to the fact 
that each of the supervisory institution has their own scope of competence, their risk tolerance 
might be different, and therefore further application of the requirements towards the subjects 
of the law may not consist of the same methodology. Basically, if, for instance, the SRS is 
responsible for supervising cash collection service providers
117
, its overall risk assessment and 
application of compatible regulatory requirements may focus on different inherited and 
residual risk indicators than it would be in case with the FCMC, for instance.  
Previously defined discrepancy was also identified by the Moneyval examination. The 
institution in its report provided an observation, which stipulated that due to the large number 
of supervisory authorities in the state, misleading and even inconsistent interpretation of the 
law by each of the supervisory authority led to the general compliance gaps
118
, which 
eventually were considered as crippling in regards to the further execution and application 
process. Additionally, due to the same issue, widely differentiated knowledge level in this 
regard was also noted as one of the emerging issues
119
, more particularly - when the actual 
sectorial risk was considered to be high, supervisory authority treated it as low or medium risk 
sector
120
. 
On the one hand, variety of supervisory authorities seems to be considered as a failure 
in regards to the effective supervision, nevertheless - if the respective authority is responsible 
for a certain number of subjects of the law, it is not overwhelmed with the monitoring and 
supervision duties, which could arise in the case where only one institution has a sole 
competence to regulate the market. Therefore such methodological approach has their own 
pluses and minuses. 
Eventually, at the beginning of this section, the author of this thesis raised the concern 
about the competences, which the SRS have in regards to the supervision of AML provisions. 
Having understood the overall risk comprehension in the sector of foreign currency exchange, 
it must be kept in mind that virtual currencies are not treated as a legal means of payment
121
. 
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This, eventually means, that although the rationale behind the executed action is quite similar 
in case with fiat currencies, the involved instruments triggers tax law related issues. Therefore 
instead of having a fiat-to-foreign currency transaction, rather barter has been established and 
virtual currency service providers are just maintaining their economic activity without 
involving the actual element of exchange. 
2.2.2. Scope of the law and key defining terms 
Having comprehended the core fundamental of the Latvian AML law and clarifying 
aspects, which surrounds supervisory authority and keeping in mind that the sole purpose of 
this thesis is to analyze virtual currency regulatory framework, the author of this work ought 
to begin with by providing two definitions, which stems from the Latvian AML law. 
virtual currency - a digital representation of the value which can be transferred, 
stored or traded digitally and operate as a means of exchange, but has not been 
recognised as a legal means of payment, cannot be recognised as a banknote and coin, 
non-cash money and electronic money, and is not a monetary value accrued in the 
payment instrument which is used in the cases referred to in Section 3, Clauses 10 and 
11 of the Law on the Payment Services and Electronic Money
122
  
And 
virtual currency service provider - the person providing virtual currency services, 
including the provider of services of exchange of the virtual currency issued by other 
persons, which provides the users with the possibility to exchange the virtual currency 
for another virtual currency by receiving commission for it, or offer to purchase and 
redeem the virtual currency through a recognised legal means of payment
123
 
The definition of virtual currencies is quite similar to the one, which has been defined 
by the AML 5th directive. Therefore the common denominator of “non-fiat currency” and 
“digital representation” establishes that Latvian legislative body and overall risk tolerance is 
in line
124
 with the perception amongst the EU legislators. Moreover, the scope of the virtual 
currency service providers has been reinforced by specifically defining what kind of services 
are considered to be supervised in regards to the Latvian AML law. These services, however, 
are: 
1) Purchase of the virtual currency by paying using the euro currency125; 
2) Sale of the virtual currency by receiving euro currency126; 
3) Virtual currency exchange to other virtual currency127; 
4) Persons operating virtual currency ATMs128. 
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As it was established previously, listed services indeed consist of exchange nature 
proceedings, i.e. if the person X is seeking to sell BTC, he/she/it will not be considered as the 
subject of the law, if the agreed value of the tradable currency will be determined regardless 
of the existing exchange rate between involved financial instruments. 
2.2.3. Minimum requirements set in the Latvian AML law 
The very first requirement set by the Latvian AML law was mentioned previously, 
whereas supervisory authority’s compatibility was discussed. As per Article 45, paragraph 3, 
virtual currency service providers are required to register their economic activity and after 10 
business days inform the SRS about expected type of its activity
129
. This, eventually, must be 
done in accordance with the Article 10, which requires subject of the law to appoint 
responsible compliance employee(-s) for the fulfilment of regulatory provisions
130
 and senior-
level executive, whose competences would allow him/her to make final and decisive decisions 
in regards to the detected internal issues in relation to the AML
131
. This obligation involves 
being directly responsible for ensuring compliance with the regulatory requirements
132
. 
Particular taxonomy can be observed in the report issued by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (hereinafter referred to as the “Basel”)133. It seeks to clarify that senior 
management executives are the core delivery team for ensuring compliance with the 
institution's risk exposures, appetite
134
 due to the fact that they supervise institutions tone of 
the top, which eventually, involves comprehending regulatory requirements in respective 
spheres of work. Sound governance in this case means fully compliant AML procedures, 
policies and mechanisms. 
Whenever the registration (not licensing) process has been conducted, proceeding 
requirement demands subject of the law to perform a risk assessment and afterwards establish 
internal control system, by considering national/internal assessment results and other risk 
increasing factors.  
In regards to it, the Latvian AML law stipulates that whenever the subject of the law 
(virtual currency service provider) performs a risk assessment or creates an internal control 
system, it must take into account risk identified by the European Commission
135
 
(supranational risk assessment), national risk assessment
136
 and other, which are relevant to 
the respective economic activity
137
. 
Having said that, the practical approach works in a way that the subject of the law in 
this case takes into account supranational risk assessment and national risk assessment 
however particular risks inherent to the virtual currency service providers are addressed in the 
report issued by the FIU and SRS. Among the other things, the FIU has established the 
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concern that companies, which are offering virtual currency related services, are considered as 
high risk companies
138
, therefore further incentives to establish business relations with banks 
or other financial institutions, and might rise additional difficulties. Nevertheless, due to the 
fact, that each financial institution has an authority to establish its own risk appetite and 
tolerance (meaning, it decides what level of risk thriving from the customer is acceptable in 
order to pursue with business relations), the game of luck in relation to virtual currency 
service providers and further cooperation can occur. This means that whenever there will be 
institutions, which are ready to tolerate high risk customers and business relation, virtual 
currency service providers can pursue with operating their business. 
Regardless of previously stated, the author of this thesis is willing to elaborate on risks 
identified by the FIU and SRS due to the fact that specific risk addressing requires certain 
further actions. 
As per the FIU has established, in regards to the virtual currencies, major risks, 
mainly, derives from anonymity, which was addressed by the EBA in 2014
139
. The SRS, as 
being the supervisory authority, also has clarified, that key risks, which must be taken into 
account prior establishing internal controls and scoring systems are anonymity
140
, transaction 
pace
141
, opaqueness
142
, untraceable money flow
143
 and cross-border transaction concerns
144
. 
These five identified risks must be respected in respective scoring systems and internal 
controls. Comprehending the fact, that some of the risk indicators are rather abstract, the 
challenge to ensure utmost compliance will arise thus leading to possible gaps, loopholes and 
false-positive result emerging
145
. To avoid such situations, by logic there should be available 
regulatory guidance provisions in order to assist subjects of the law with their incentives to be 
compliant with the law, however giving the fact, that these identified risks are rather abstract, 
it is impossible to establish unified guidance provisions
146
, ergo leaving a wide room for 
interpretation. 
Furthermore - after the internal control and scoring system requirements have been set 
straight, due diligence and reporting requirements are the subsequent binding provisions, 
which must be respected by the virtual currency service providers. 
Article 11
147
 provides situations whereas virtual currency service providers are 
required to conduct the CDD. Almost everything, what is stipulated there, must be respected, 
therefore regulatory burden becomes quite comprehensive.  These requirements, inter alia, 
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provides basis for reporting to the FIU
148
 in case if lack of information or suspicious activity 
has been detected
149
. As per understanding the law, these requirements were designated for 
the subjects, which were introduced by the third and fourth AML directive, therefore their 
applicability might rise challenges in regards to the virtual currency service providers. For 
instance - understanding the fact, that provided exchange services consists of immediate 
nature, there might be situations where it could be merely impossible to detect suspicious 
transactions at all, thus leading to unreported potential money laundering and terrorist 
financing cases
150
. 
Article 11
1
, 12 and 13 provides basis for KYC requirements. These, nevertheless, are 
intended in order to identify potential customer prior establishing business relations (also, 
these requirements must be respected during existing business relation
151
). Due to the fact, 
that transaction monitoring in this regard might rise challenges, KYC framework should be as 
robust as possible, since primordial compliance thrives from properly identifying the potential 
service user/customer. Having said that, there are no additional and tailored requirements for 
virtual currency service providers to consider prior identifying customer, however, since this 
type of service underlines new risks, the classic identification approach might not be 
sufficient. 
One of the requirements, which could reinforce the whole identification process, 
touches upon the IP addresses
152
. I.e. whenever the virtual currency service provider has an 
opportunity to establish new business relations, potential IP address, which is perceived to be 
used, should be obtained. In practice this could assist in identifying red flags stemming from 
customer’s activities, ergo whenever the exchange transaction occurs from different IP 
address, automatically generated alert indicates that there is a discrepancy, which requires 
further investigation. The same methodology could be used in a way, that the service provider 
obtains computer machine-ID and ensures that it gets validated whenever the person is 
logging into its account or making the transaction. 
Indeed, it is possible to already establish certain opposing arguments for why this 
could lead to regulatory burden, such as - whenever the person changes the location, its IP 
address will also be changed, persons tend to acquire new computers, etc., however, 
comprehending the fact that virtual currencies already possess high risk to the financial sector 
and perceiving ,that part of people are conducting/executing transactions while being 
physically at the same spot, such step could at least, at minimum, reinforce the identification 
and monitoring scope, thus increasing the possibility to avoid money mulling
153
 or any 
unconfirmed third person involvement. This, eventually, also could alert occasions, whenever 
there might be a high difference between registered geography and actually used, while also 
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taking into account time pace  between last executed transaction and current. Nevertheless, 
such solution should be tailored taking into account potential compliance costs and potential 
customer outreach, assuming that there is an employee who contacts the customer 
immediately after the alert has been detected. 
Aforementioned is one of many example of what particular identifications steps could 
be used in order to reinforce the KYC protocol. At some point, this could ease the compliance 
burden in a way that more possible SAR reports to the FIU would be made and also “bad 
customer” portfolio would clear out naturally. Eventually, as per the Latvian AML law, all 
obtained identification related information must be verified against respective independent 
and reliable sources
154
. 
By expanding on the identification requirement, the Latvian AML law as an inevitable 
requirement, has subjected the transaction monitoring requirement on frequent and continuous 
basis
155
. Hereby, as it was stated elsewhere in the thesis, the core nature of exchange services 
relies on immediate transaction pace, which essentially impacts utmost compliance. 
Notwithstanding the scope of the transaction monitoring, it goes hand in hand with the 
enhanced due diligence (hereinafter referred to as the “EDD”) and simplified due diligence156 
(hereinafter referred to as the “SDD”) requirements, since it involves transaction and 
customer in-depth analysis
157
. However in this case, due to the fact that virtual currency 
business is considered to have a high risk economic activity, EDD should be performed on 
more frequent basis than SSD, thus ensuring utmost compliance and avoiding any potential 
regulatory discrepancies. 
By having lack of tailored regulatory guidelines/requirements in this regard, the 
monitoring itself should be established on already existing foundations or guidelines, which 
are applicable to other alike subjects of the law - foreign currency exchange services or at 
some point exchange as such. The rationale behind such approach, although, has not been 
stipulated by legislators, could stem from similarities in economic activity and provided 
services, therefore in order to perform sufficient transaction monitoring, virtual currency 
service providers could adopt transaction scenarios identified by international watchdogs, 
Latvijas Banka and the SRS, for instance. Mentioned transaction scenarios works in a way 
that, for instance, the law addresses or the supervisory authority has identified specific risks, 
which are quite substantive and points out possible fraudulent activity options. Eventually, the 
institution, which is considered as the subject of the law, is required to implement these 
scenarios in algorithmic way, considering their magnitude, thresholds and technical scope. As 
per ACAMS has clarified, proper scenario implementation ensures risk focused transaction 
detection
158
, internal compliance gap detection
159
 and automatic alert generation if thresholds 
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are set
160
. These three main advantages seeks to ease compliance burden and reinforce 
internal control efficiency. 
Hence, considering Latvian approach, the counter comparison must be addressed by 
introducing industry best practice, which in this case stems from the US. Due to the fact, that 
the US financial sector is attractive for people seeking money laundering activities
161
, their 
adopted regulatory approach will serve the purpose for developing an argument. 
The report issued by the audit company KPMG describes an approach introduced by 
the US authorities - alongside the transaction monitoring requirements
162
, there are 
requirements stipulating the transaction filtering. This filtering, however, in other words, 
serves the key purpose of detecting and indicating the transactions, which are related to the 
OFAC (the Office of Foreign Asset Control) announced regimes or sanctions
163
. In practice 
that means that virtual currency service providers are required to adopt OFAC risk assessment 
directly, thus ensuring compliance with it.
164
 Ergo it means, that whatever inherent risks 
OFAC has identified, they must be implemented in the subject’s internal control system, thus 
- extended transaction monitoring/filtering policy. 
Eventually such diversification robust the whole monitoring process due to the fact 
that unified approach in terms of detecting sanction or ML violations/schemes has been 
adopted by all industry subjects. Indeed, Latvian regulatory framework also requires to 
establish a sanction monitoring system, however the key difference is that there is no 
obligation, which requires a particular subject of the law directly take into account national 
sanction risk assessment
165
 or related document. Hence, it must be based on it, however it is 
not directly binding or applicable. 
Furthermore, as it was discussed previously, the subject of the law is responsible for 
reporting on suspicious transactions/activity
166
, if one has been detected or observed. 
Therefore, in case if the virtual currency service provider has obtained information, which 
rises legitimate concerns (regardless of the transaction status), immediate actions are required. 
Additionally, immediate reporting requirements must be respected in case of submission of 
threshold declaration
167
. Respective provisions sets two detailed scenarios when the 
submission is necessary, i.e. - when the customer executes cash transaction, which is 
equivalent to the amount of 7000 EUR
168
, and when the customer receives or executes cross-
border transaction (not necessarily cash transaction) equivalent to the amount of 500 000 
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EUR
169
. These thresholds, however, are introduced in order to supplement existing internal 
controls
170
 and monitoring systems.  
In order to comprehend different regulatory approaches in this regard, the following 
part of this paper will be devoted for analysing requirements set in the Estonian AML law. 
The analysis itself will emphasize differences and methodologies used for regulating virtual 
currency service providers, thus giving an overview of what are the possible solutions to 
ensure effective compliance. Having understood that, comparison between Latvian and 
Estonian approaches will be established, thus elaborating on aspects, which can be considered 
as tailored/applicable and which might not.   
2.3. AML minimum regulatory requirements in Estonian legal system in 
regards to the virtual currency service providers 
Beforehand minimum requirements set in the Latvian legal framework were discussed and 
analyzed, thus emphasizing approach taken by the respective supervisory authority. As it was 
clarified, virtual currency service providers in Latvia were rendered as the subjects of the law 
without applying tailored risk assessing mechanisms. Due to the fact, that this kind of 
economic activity underlines great pile of anonymity concerns, more tailored approach would 
benefit both - supervisory authority and the subject itself. On the other hand, Latvian SRS has 
provided little guidelines in this regard besides general clarification material, therefore virtual 
currency service providers lacks soft law instruments in order to effectively establish 
numerical risk scoring system considering particular identified risk indicators, for instance. 
The rationale behind examining Estonian legislative framework in regards to the AML 
provision thrives from the beneficial economic and regulatory environment
171
, which attracts 
foreign investors and allows them to proceed with their business models and visions. Due to 
the fact that Estonian regulatory framework is quite fintech friendly, for the sake of the 
analysis their implemented AML virtual currency service provider’s requirements will be 
examined in a detail.  
2.3.1. Supervisory authority 
As per following the same skeleton introduced previously, the analysis will be started by 
explaining legal basis related to supervisory authority's competence. Importance of 
mentioning it stems from the fact that sound internal governance at some extent derives from 
sound supervision framework
172
, therefore the author of this thesis stipulates and reinforces 
the core and initial argument by providing comprehensive sector overview. 
Credit institutions, as well as financial institutions in general in Estonia are supervised 
by the Estonian Financial Supervision and Resolution Authority (in Estonian - 
                                                 
169
 Ibid, 5.1.2. 
170
 Kristīna Loboda, Sliekšņa deklarācijas – kam un kā tās būs jāiesniedz, 02.12.2019, Available at 
https://lvportals.lv/skaidrojumi/311016-slieksna-deklaracijas-kam-un-ka-tas-bus-jaiesniedz-2019, Accessed on 
05.05.2020. 
171
 OECD, Economic Survey of Estonia (December 2019), p. 4, Available at 
https://www.oecd.org/economy/estonia-economic-snapshot/ ,Accessed on 05.05.2020. 
172
 Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, OECD, 2009, p. 26, 
Available at https://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/42229620.pdf, Accessed on 05.05.2020. 
  
35 
 
Finantsinspektsioon) (hereinafter referred to as the “FSA”). Institution itself is seeking to 
enhance “the stability, reliability, transparency and efficiency of the financial sector”173. As it 
was mentioned above, one of the supervised sector is financial institutions, hence according to 
the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Estonian AML law”) Article 2 paragraph 5, which stipulates that “The provisions of this Act 
governing financial institutions apply to virtual currency service providers [...].”174, virtual 
currency service providers should be treated as classical financial institutions, meaning that 
relatively similar requirements are directly binding to these subjects of the law. This, 
however, establishes grounds for more unified approach for the FSA to govern and protect 
integrity of the Estonian financial sector. 
Eventually, such requirement indeed hinders compliance requirements due to the fact 
that related FSA passed recommendations and additional provisions in regards to the financial 
institutions are now also directly applicable to the virtual currency service providers, unless 
otherwise stated. Particular set of procedural provision increases not only the regulatory 
burden, but also related system and procedure creation and performance costs since additional 
manpower and resources ought to be needed for proper maintenance matters. 
On the other hand, as it was mentioned previously, unified governance ensures more 
efficient supervision mechanism since requirements, which must be met and respected, are 
almost equal to all subjects of the law. Thus the element of risk-based perception and 
interpretation of the law is excluded, which leads to avoiding potential opportunities to 
fictitiously create compliance gaps. 
2.3.2. Scope of the law and key defining terms 
Due to the fact, that it is up to each MS to interpret the law in accordance with its own risk 
perception, relevant terminology should also be emphasized in order to comprehend the 
existing regulatory scope and perspective. 
Estonian AML law introduces virtual currencies and related elements similarly as in 
the case of Latvia: 
virtual currency means a value represented in the digital form, which is digitally 
transferable, preservable or tradable and which natural persons or legal persons accept 
as a payment instrument, but that is not the legal tender of any country or funds [...]
175
 
And 
virtual currency exchange service means a service with the help of which a person 
exchanges a virtual currency against a fiat currency or a fiat currency against a virtual 
currency or a virtual currency against another virtual currency
176177
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As it is observable, virtual currency exchange service providers are categorized into 
three sub-subjects stipulating following economic activity: 
1. Virtual currency exchange to a fiat currency178; 
2. Fiat currency exchange to a virtual currency179; 
3. Virtual currency exchange to another virtual currency180. 
Also, as in the case of Latvia, virtual currency wallet service providers are considered 
as the relevant subjects of the law, thus having the same regulatory requirements as in the case 
of virtual currency exchange service providers. 
However, since this thesis is limited in its scope to analyze only virtual currency 
exchange service providers, the FSA has clarified that virtual currency “mining”181 activities 
are not part of the supervision, thus are not required to be compliant with the AML 
requirements and provisions
182
. Therefore, for the avoidance of doubt, companies, which 
ensures virtual currency mining activities, should pay attention to taxation aspects and 
relevant provisions
183
. 
2.3.3. Minimum requirements set in the Estonian AML law 
For the purposes of this section, the author seeks to clarify and analyze minimum 
requirements set by the Estonian AML law in regards to the virtual currency exchange service 
providers. As it can be established already and taking into account the fact that Estonia 
provides beneficial regulatory and market conditions for innovative and new businesses, the 
author of this thesis expects seeing minor, but at the same time crucial regulatory differences 
compared to the Latvian AML law. 
Previously it was already established that virtual currency exchange service providers 
are considered as the financial institutions
184
, therefore regulatory requirements in this regard 
are also applicable to them. Following above introduced structure, the first outlined element 
touches upon the registration requirement. 
According to the General Part of the Economic Activities Code Act (hereinafter 
referred to as the “GPEACA”), all undertakings, whose economic activity is not an exception 
prescribed by the GPEACA
185
, are required to register their activity to Economic 
administrative authority
186
. Nevertheless, in addition to that, Article 70 of the Estonian AML 
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Law requires virtual currency exchange service providers to obtain supplementary license
187
 
from the FSA
188
. 
In theory as well as in practice, acquisition of a license indicates that particular service 
provider/business operator has expressed an incentive to operate accordingly to the law, thus 
acquisition of a license puts on a reputational stamp to said company. For the customer, 
recognition of a license increases the level of trustworthiness and dependence on particular 
institutions provided services or business model. 
By elaborating on aforementioned, in order to receive a license from the FSA, virtual 
currency exchange service provider is required to follow requirements set in the Estonian 
AML Law (specifically - Article 70 and 72). Notwithstanding that, there are some 
straightforward requirements, which limits non-resident possibilities to maintain economic 
activity in Estonia, for instance, if any of involved person (both legal and natural) in the 
virtual currency exchange service company is considered as non-resident, certificate of the 
criminal records database must be authenticated by a notary
189
 and submitted to the FSA. 
Additionally, in order to even perform economic activity, the registered seat, the seat of the 
management board and place of business must be in Estonia
190
. Also reputation, capital and 
other requirements are posed as mandatory provisions to virtual currency exchange service 
providers. 
Particular licensing requirements sets high barrier for these subjects, thus increasing 
the compliance costs.  Considering that part of them came into force on March 2020, the 
conclusion can be derived that impact stemming from 5th AML directive is quite substantial, 
therefore developed requirements/mechanisms seeks to mitigate any potential and existing 
risks. 
One of the reasons, why such requirements in general are introduced could stem from 
the fact that Danske bank branch, which was registered in Estonia, was involved in significant 
money laundering scandal, where estimated 200 billion EUR were funneled through Estonian 
financial system using said branch
191
. Although a bank essentially is not the same concept as 
virtual currency exchange institution, reputational damage has been done and effective further 
risk mitigation mechanisms could renew the integrity of the Estonian financial system 
(regardless that Basel institute of governance has ranked Estonia as the most safest country in 
terms of ML amongst 125 other countries
192
). On the other hand, the number of issued 
licenses from until 2017
193
 to virtual currency service providers in Estonia was sky rocking, 
indicating that the law within the time was too informative and less efficient in regards to 
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regulatory supervision. It provided attractive thresholds, which did not impose any difficulties 
for passing them
194
.  
Moreover, due to the fact that FSA has the authority to issue operational licenses, it 
also has the right to revoke them in case if it finds legitimate reason for such action
195
 or there 
has been a compliance violation,
196
 which underlines great pile of threats. Specific, subject 
oriented license revocation has not been specified in the respective law, therefore it can be 
concluded that subjects, which are specified in Article 70
197
, can get their licenses revoked by 
the FSA. 
On the one hand, in order to maintain economic activity by providing virtual currency 
exchange services, the AML 5th directive sets a requirement to register in each operating MS. 
Concluding that licensing requirements are much stricter than registration (if there are any), 
the reliance concern raises. Comprehending the synergy between both, it would make sense 
that, if particular company, operating as a virtual currency exchange service provider, has 
obtained the license in one state, which is a part of the EU (therefore theoretically having 
integrated the same applicable legislative mechanisms), its recognition in other should at least 
at the minimum, give more beneficial circumstances in order to establish economic activity 
there. Nevertheless, stemming directly from the Estonian AML law, there are no 
requirements, which would allow or which would refuse such action, however, the Estonian 
government has clarified that reliance on licenses issued outside Estonia is not possible
198
. 
Since virtual currency exchange service providers are considered as the financial 
institutions (from the Estonian AML law point of view), there are additional and more straight 
forward requirements to which the particular subject must be compliant. Having identified 
and analyzed provisions governing licensing and registering, supplementary ones, which 
touches upon internal control system, risk appetite and etc., will also be perceived by the 
scope of this thesis. 
As in the case with financial institutions, current legislative framework seeks virtual 
currency exchange service providers to establish effective risk management system
199
, which 
must be reinforced by clarifying and identifying preliminary threats stemming from used 
products, geographies involved and etc.
200
. Accumulated result, in theory, must serve the 
purpose for proposing an efficient risk detection mechanism, which supplements and “guides” 
institution’s daily operations. Due to the fact that the business model itself is quite risky in 
terms of risk management or stability, respective institutions should be very strict and wise in 
their decisions, while agreeing on tolerable risk. For instance, delivery channel (which is one 
of the key components of risk management strategy) should be clearly defined, e.g. whether 
the potential customer will be able to utilize only online service or also specified ATMs are 
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going to be used
201
. The same analogy would be attributable to the identification process, e.g., 
to what extent non face-to-face identification can be tolerated
202
. 
Moreover, regulatory provisions, inter alia, also pushes virtual currency exchange 
service providers to establish risk appetite
203
, which must be prepared by the institution’s 
senior management
204
. As per it is clarified by the same article, virtual currency exchange 
service provider is requested to presume its potential customer
205
 and tolerable risk profile. By 
elaborating on potential customer profile, it has also been stated that in case with: 
1) Foreign national206 
2) Person residing outside the European Economic Area (hereinafter 
referred to as the “EEA”)207 
3) Natural person, whose transaction volume exceeds 15 000 EUR per 
calendar month
208
 
4) Legal person, whose transaction volume exceeds 25 000 EUR per 
calendar month
209
 
Only two identification scenarios (by using information technology means) are 
possible - either by concluding face-to-face identification
210
 or by showing an ID card issued 
by following states
211
: 
1) Germany 
2) Italy 
3) Croatia 
4) Estonia 
5) Spain 
6) Luxembourg 
7) Belgium 
8) Portugal 
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9) United Kingdom 
10)  Czech Republic 
11)  The Netherlands 
12)  Slovakia 
13)  Latvia 
This, however, creates a challenge for maintaining an effective business model. The 
virtual currency exchange service provider is now practically forbidden to provide its services 
to persons, who are considered as non-residents and do not have an ID card issued in 
aforementioned jurisdictions due to the fact that it would be highly unpractical for them to 
obtain either a legally binding document issued in country other than their residence one or e-
residence card issued in Estonia. Indeed, theoretically, such option of course exists (to have 
these types of persons as customers), although in practice there would be a small number of 
persons ready to engage in such bureaucratic procedure. The same requirement applies to 
customers, who have already established a relationship with the virtual currency exchange 
service provider, which has acquired respective license prior these requirements came in 
force, thus currently they have an obligation to renew their license prior 1st of July, 2020
212
. 
Furthermore, the due diligence measures, including identification of the customer, 
monitoring of business relationship, EDDs, SDDs are also a part of the virtual currency 
exchange service provider regulatory scope.  
By slightly elaborating on previously mentioned, in general, the due diligence 
categorizes in two segments - upon the establishment of a business relationship
213
 and during 
the ongoing monitoring of it
214
. These measures must be tolerated in order to fulfil obligations 
set by the KYC principles for the whole period, whenever the virtual currency exchange 
service provider has a practical or theoretical relationship with the customer. Inter alia, 
identification and verification requirements, nevertheless, have not been tailored for the 
purpose of particular subjects of the law, however, since the financial institution element is 
compatible in this situation, requirements stemming from the law of “Requirements and 
procedure for identification of persons and verification of person’s identity data with 
information technology means”215 must be implemented in their internal procedures, thus 
displaying compliance with this normative act as well. 
Both EDD and SDD approaches can be used in order to examine a customer, however, 
the EDD must be applied in situations whereas the risk has been identified as higher-than-
usual
216
. Whilst SDD can be applied only when the customer has been scored with the risk 
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rating of low
217
. Given the fact, that virtual currency business constitutes higher risk than any 
other businesses, the SDD approach, although in theory would be possible, in practice should 
not be applied, unless the institution has adopted “step-ahead” requirements, which are much 
stricter than established in the national legislation, thus ensuring developed compliance 
mechanism for clearing out customers, who possess a relatively smaller risk for financial 
institutions in general, but higher risk for virtual currency service providers. 
The last requirement, to which virtual currency exchange service provider must be 
compliant, is an obligation report to the FIU if the suspicious activity/transaction has been 
identified
218
. The process must be done in accordance with the Estonian AML Law and FSA 
issued guidelines on the same matter
219
. Suspicious characteristics, however, has been listed 
in the additional document
220
, which has been issued by the Police and Border Guard Board 
of Estonia. Notwithstanding the scope designated for the financial institutions, there are 
specifically tailored characteristics, which are compatible with virtual currency exchange 
service providers.  
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3. LATVIAN AML LAW MINIMUM REQUIREMENT COMPARISON TO ESTONIAN 
AML LAW MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS 
The second chapter identified what the minimum requirements set in respective Estonian and 
Latvian legislation in regards to the virtual currency exchange service providers are. By 
having emphasized theoretical application against the practical one, the author of this thesis 
used the best industry practice as well as fictitious scenarios throughout which potential gaps 
and further non-compliance might arise. 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a comparative overview of how large the 
regulatory burden might be if the person decides to operate its virtual currency exchange 
service business in one or another country. A fictitious scenario will be used to elaborate on 
the pros and cons of stemming from both legal systems. 
Let’s suppose that there is a company X, which considers entering the Baltic market 
and operate as virtual currency exchange service provider, however, it has not yet decided, at 
which particular state it must register the legal person. There are two options - Estonia or 
Latvia. Therefore the first aspect touches upon the registration. 
As it was analyzed in the thesis, in Latvia the requirement is to register virtual 
currency exchange service provider’s economic activity without obtaining any license or 
authorization document, whilst in Estonia, it is an obligation to obtain one. This, however, 
raises two additional concerns - Estonian regulatory framework seeks to be more costly since 
the institution has to pay a fee of 3 300 EUR for receiving a license
221
 (previously it was 345 
EUR). In addition, due to the fact that operational license is required, in case if it gets 
revoked, the institution may not pursue with its business activity in Estonia anymore. Thus 
both - reputational and financial damage could be faced. As per understanding that by 
receiving a license, sort of classification is attributed, the virtual currency exchange service 
provider in Estonia will be considered as the financial institution, i.e. all the regulatory 
requirements regulating financial institutions in regards to the AML will be applicable to the 
virtual currency exchange service provider. Also, in Estonia, the senior management is 
required to submit an extensive load of good-reputation ensuring documents in order to 
ensure that particular business will not be used in order to facilitate ML, 
Nevertheless, this on the other hand also provides clarity and a unified approach 
towards equal regulatory treatment and further issuing any guidelines or recommendations. 
Basically - whenever there will be uncertainty about how the law should be interpreted in case 
of virtual currency exchange service providers, the general consideration will be derived from 
comprehending the scope of financial institutions, nonetheless, such interpretation also could 
lead to lack of efficient regulation since virtual currency exchange service providers are not 
perceived as a single and unique subject of the law.  
Moreover, comprehending the next regulatory requirement, in Latvia as well as in 
Estonia, virtual currency exchange service provider is subjected to establish an internal 
control system and, therefore, internal risk assessment. Since in both jurisdictions virtual 
currency exchange service providers are considered as high-risk business operators, attitude, 
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which thrives from banks, for instance, might be similar in both jurisdictions in case if a 
willingness to open a company’s bank account occurs. Although, given the fact, that in 
Estonia virtual currency exchanges are treated as financial institutions, overall risk perception 
could be more supportive since in theory credit institutions should be aware of the regulatory 
requirements and potential treatment from the supervisory authority towards the financial 
institutions, thus virtual currency exchange service providers.  
Elaborating on previously mentioned, Swiss credit institutions, notwithstanding the 
fact that Switzerland has a beneficial environment for virtual currency businesses
222
, also are 
protective in terms of building a relationship with such service providers
223
, however, the 
future with such market participants is inevitable, thus robust and strict due diligence 
requirements are expected to guide onboarding experience for virtual currency businesses.  
By emphasizing internal systems as such, again, in case of Latvia, there are general 
requirements and almost no guidance at all on how to create specific and even tailored control 
system or risk assessment. Indeed, the SRS, being as the supervisory authority, has issued one 
document in relation to the AML compliance, however, comparing to the pile of 
recommendations and guidelines issued by the FCMC for credit institutions, for instance, it 
may appear as insufficient in terms of regulating such market participants. 
On the contrary - Estonian approach on the same regard is more comprehensive than it 
is in the case with Latvia since the common denominator of financial institution exists. This 
eventually means, that issued guidelines, recommendations and other binding legal acts could 
be treated as supplementary tools since general clarifications or elaborations are expected to 
be more convenient to establish aforementioned systems. Although, as it was mentioned, such 
situation arises only by comparing to Latvia’s example, because still tailored requirements are 
missing and detailed clarification, specifically designated for such service providers, are not 
yet introduced in both legal systems. By extending the scope of internal risk assessment, the 
virtual currency exchange service provided under Estonian AML law is required to draft a 
risk appetite statement and as it was discussed previously, such statement seeks to give a clear 
tone from the top motto, which sets institution’s tolerable level of risks. Although, since it has 
not been required by Latvian AML law requirements, it does not mean that virtual currency 
exchange service provider cannot establish one for itself in order to clearly define its risk 
capacity to achieve its strategic objectives and business plan
224
. It, eventually, could be 
considered as a good internal communication channel amongst employees, which maintains 
an up-to-date mindset of what are the institution's goals on overseeing future. 
By comparing due diligence requirements, inter alia, identification, verification, 
transaction monitoring, KYC, EDD, SDD, they are relatively same in regards to virtual 
currency exchange service providers. Both jurisdictions have considered overall approach, 
therefore there are no major differences. The common theme is that the virtual currency 
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exchange service provider is required to know its customer, business relationships and 
aggregate existing scope of the aforementioned. As per comprehending that one of the critical 
components of the whole due diligence scope touches upon the transaction monitoring, both 
jurisdictions could ensure blockchain algorithmic approach, which detects particular patterns, 
characteristics
225
 and if, historically, particular blockchain account has been associated with 
the criminal nature/activity, integration of automated such account recognition
226
. EDD, SDD 
and identification requirements are relatively similar, although in case of Estonia if the 
institution is willing to have a business relationship with a customer, who is considered as a 
non-resident, he/she will have to acquire additional legal documentation (from either Estonia 
itself or “partnering” countries), which would allow meeting regulatory requirements set by 
the Estonian AML law. This process, in practice, is quite unattractive, therefore business 
expansion by involving a variety of non-resident customers will be limited, and thus financial 
benefit could be lost. 
Furthermore, by comparing obligation to report, both jurisdictions have imposed 
similar requirements in this regard. Mainly, whenever the institution detects a suspiciousness 
regarding the activity or financial transaction, it must immediately report it to the respective 
FIU. The difference, however, arises in case of Estonia, since virtual currency exchange 
service providers should rely on already identified characteristics (since financial institution 
element comes into play), although given the complexity of the business model itself, the 
institution must establish more tailored characteristics to its economic activity in order to be 
more compliant, thus ensuring more efficient internal governance framework. 
Eventually, the last aspect, which requires comparison, touches upon the supervisory 
authority’s element. In Latvia, there are in total 4 supervisors, which are responsible for the 
specific subject of the law supervision. While Latvijas Banka supervises foreign currency 
exchange service providers (which economic activity is similar to the virtual currency 
exchange service providers), the SRS, on the other hand, is responsible for supervising virtual 
currency exchange service providers. As it was discussed previously in the paper, this from 
the logical point of view seems rather unusual since both have a relatively similar concept of 
economic activity. Therefore different perspectives and interpretation methods could be 
observed. In case of Estonia, subjects of the law are supervised by one authority, i.e. the FSA. 
This type of supervision ensures consistency and efficiency in terms of unified approach as 
well as there are no interpretation gaps between multiple supervisors, as it is in case of Latvia.  
By considering all compared requirements, general remark can be established that 
from the business point of view, Latvia seems more attractive since there is a wide room for 
interpretation left. Although, it also means, that since there is almost no practical experience 
in regulating these market participants, the first audited service providers will emphasize the 
overall picture of how they are getting along with the compliance matters. In case of Estonia, 
although the first impression might seem as cost-driving, the regulatory burden might ensure 
higher compliance, thus risk mitigation mechanisms will be tolerated with higher deference. 
The decision to enter the particular market should be based on understanding whether the 
                                                 
225
 Sherri Scott, Transaction Monitoring Cryptocurrency compliance: An AML perspective, 
2018, p. 8, Available at https://fraudfighting.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Cryptocurrency_Compliance_An_AML_Perspective_S.Scott_.pdf , Accessed on 11.05.
2020. 
226
 Ibid. 
  
45 
 
company wants to make a profit or it wants to be sure that less risky transactions go through 
its internal financial systems.  
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Conclusion 
By referring back to the initially asked research question “To what extent minimum 
requirements set in Latvian and Estonian AML law are attributable to the virtual currency 
exchange service providers?” the answer is divided in two parts. 
As per comprehending the minimum requirements stemming from the Latvian AML 
law, concluding marks are as follows. Among the other things, it appears that the approach 
used in order to subject virtual currency service providers is quite formal, meaning that there 
are no strict guidelines or even tailored requirements introduced by the legislator/supervisory 
authority in order to prevent financial crime in a particular sphere. Such a notion rises 
substantive concerns about the efficiency and compatibility of compliance, thus leading to 
possible fines from regulator and failure to ensure adequate mechanisms in this regard. 
Moreover, understanding that first regulatory analysis/results on virtual currency service 
providers will be available only in late 2020 or early 2021, ignorance of acceptable 
compliance program will be actual and relevant since there are no examples of how it should 
be operated or maintained, therefore this “pilot” year may disclose and emphasize legislative 
gaps and cornerstones. 
On the other hand, virtual currency exchange service providers under Estonian AML 
law have been treated as financial institutions. Such categorisation, from the author’s 
perspective, is neither effective nor incapable. On the one hand, by imposing the same 
requirements as financial institutions have, the regulatory framework for virtual currency 
business, in general, is more straightforward and consists of strict obligations to which it must 
be compliant. It indeed gives more structured approach, which must be considered prior 
investing in such business opportunity. Even banks, for instance, prior opening accounts for 
these service providers, in theory, are ensured that their business model is regulated and 
should be in line with requirements set in the respective law, however the underlined risk still 
is quite high and in some cases - impossible to tolerate
227
. And this, eventually, rises other 
concern - even by being compliant to the requirements designated for the financial 
institutions, more tailored approach is still missing. The law itself and assigned 
recommendations are not focusing on giving a tailored regulatory framework, which would be 
suitable to ensure, firstly, compliance matters for virtual currency exchange service providers 
and secondly, reasonable environment to operate in this business sector. 
Therefore, the general conclusion can be established - both jurisdictions lack tailored 
requirements and guidance’s, which would allow these subjects to ensure technical 
compliance at its utmost notion. In theory, formal requirements exist to which these particular 
subjects must be compliant, however, in practice, there could arise a variety of unanswered 
questions and misinterpreted regulatory concepts. 
As per elaborating on the second research question “Which of the above-mentioned 
jurisdictions provides more beneficial environment to operate a virtual currency exchange 
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service requirement business?”, the answer should be perceived by either looking from the 
business or legal point of view. 
The business point of view suggests that Latvia is more attractive in terms of 
establishing a virtual currency exchange service providing company since the regulatory 
burden is not as costly as it is in case of Estonia. Latvia provides more general requirements, 
which, although will increase costs for a particular subject of the law, will not accumulate a 
very high expense report. Estonia, on the other hand, already starts being costly by imposing a 
licensing requirement, for instance, therefore the monetary factor comes not only in, but also 
further reputational one must be considered alongside with the previous. 
Subsequently, the analysis and provided evidence ensured that Estonian imposed 
regulatory framework, since being derived from the financial institution perspective, implies 
that there is several additional requirements, which are not considered by Latvian legislator, 
for instance. 
This, however, leads to the second point of view - legal. Estonian regulatory 
obligations are stricter then they are compared to Latvian, therefore the business side does not 
have a substantial benefit in this regard. Admittedly, Latvia might seem as a pleasant 
environment at first glance, however regulatory requirements in Estonia provides more clarity 
and trustability of the sector in general. Since the treatment stems from financial institutions, 
it could be expected that the same compliance standards will be respected. 
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